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Is the genie out of the bottle?
Digital platforms and the
future of clinical trials
Niccolò Tempini and David Teira
Abstract
Is it possible to conduct impartial clinical trials in a world full of digital networking
tools that patients can use to coordinate themselves and act against research pro-
tocols? This paper builds on an ethnography of PatientsLikeMe, a company
running an internet social media network where patients with different conditions
share their clinical data with standardized questionnaires. The company faced a
serious dilemma in 2011 when some ALS patients, members of the site, started
sharing data about a phase II clinical trial of an experimental drug (NP001) in
which some of them were participating, to anticipate the experiment’s outcomes
and understand each one’s allocation over trial arms. In parallel, some other
patients were using the site and other web tools to coordinate and run their
own replication of the trial with homebrew mixes of industrial grade chemicals.
PatientsLikeMe researchers reflected on their position as networks managers
and eventually decided to use the collected data to develop their own analysis
of the efficacy of the original compound, and of the homebrewers’ compound.
They presented the NP001 events as a case in point for articulating a new
social contract for clinical research. This paper analyses these events, first, by
understanding the clinical trial as an experiment organization form that can
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succeed only as long as its protocol can be enforced; second, we observe how web
networks make it dramatically easier for the trial protocol to be violated; finally, we
point out how a potentially dangerous confluence of interests over web networks
could incubate developments that disrupt the status quo without creating a robust
and safe alternative for experimentation. We conclude by warning about the inter-
ests of the pharmaceutical industry in exploiting patients’methodological requests
to its own advantage.
Keywords: social media; digital networks; patient activism; patient-led research;
clinical trial; blinding.
1. Introduction
Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) is a very rare, lethal and debilitating neu-
rological disease for which no cure has yet been discovered. While prognosis is
two to five years life expectancy from the date of diagnosis, research is slow, as
with most orphan diseases: there are not enough patients to consistently attract
research programme funding or to run clinical trials with enough statistical
power to detect the real effects of potential treatments (Sinha, 2013). While
patients are progressively paralyzed as a result of the damage to their
nerves, their cognitive capacities are unaffected. The experience, for patients
and their friends and families, is excruciating. The dramatic condition created
by the disease means that the ALS community is well known for a high level of
activism and empathy, as is the ingenuity of grassroots organizations in pro-
moting awareness and fundraising. Despite being relatively small, the ALS
community has been able to occasionally push its plight into the mainstream
– for instance, through the viral ‘ice bucket challenge’ (Wikipedia, 2018). By
the same token, self-experimentation with a range of safe and unsafe treat-
ments is endemic.
Since 2008, Eric Valor has lived paralyzed in bed and depends on life-sus-
taining technological supports. And yet, like many other ALS patients, he has
been incredibly socially active thanks to sophisticated computing interfaces
and the internet. Valor took ALS patient activism one step further when he
launched the ALS Chlorite Project (ACP) in 2011. This was a collective
self-experiment in which patients tried a homemade compound with (purport-
edly) the same active principle of NP001, an experimental treatment that was
being developed and tested by a small Californian biotech company, Neural-
tus.1 The ACP website intended to gather patients interested in testing
sodium chlorite (an industrial pesticide and cleaner – see Wikipedia, 2016)
in an oral solution and sharing information about the effects.2 The ACP pro-
vided its participants with a library of relevant scientific literature and a study
protocol, including a dosage calculator and a sheet to be filled in with the treat-
ment outcomes (ACP, 2011). In parallel, Neuraltus was testing NP001 in a
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conventional (phase II) randomized clinical trial (RCT), scheduled from Feb-
ruary 2011 to September 2012.
Another accomplishment of ALS activism is PatientsLikeMe (PLM). Started
in 2005 by activists with a family history of ALS and a background in not-for-
profit organizations (the ALS Therapy Development Institute), PLM is a
website and ‘patient-powered research network’ that gathers patients suffering
from thousands of different conditions. Patients can track their own health
(recording information about symptoms, conditions, hospitalizations, treatment
evaluations and other dimensions of patient health and experience), see their
progress via visualizations and analytics, and connect and socialize with other
patients. No advertisement is present on the website, but PLM is owned by a
for-profit organization, PatientsLikeMe Inc., which generates revenue with
the sale of pseudonymised data and custom research services, mainly to pharma-
ceutical corporations.
This study examines what happened when some of the participants in the
ACP and in the Neuraltus trial used the PLM platform to coordinate with
other patients and share their outcomes. This initiative took patient-led experi-
mentation to a new level of complexity (cfr. Vayena, 2014). Patients were
sharing data from an ongoing RCT of a new drug, NP001, and from self-orga-
nized experiments with different homemade proxies for the same drug at the
same time. These data were analyzed not just by patients, but also by PLM
researchers, and they were eventually published in various forms.
All this may be praised as a feat of patient-led research, although more for its
organizational achievements than for the scientific value of the (inconclusive)
outcome it yielded, as we will explain. Yet, all this activity and the disclosure
of data from the Neuraltus trial on PLM put at stake the trial’s own scientific
reliability. RCTs are comparative experiments in which participants receive
either the new or the conventional treatment, so that their effects can be com-
pared. In standard RCTs, the participants are blinded about the treatments they
receive so that the trial outcome remains uncontaminated by their expectations
(e.g. placebo effects). In the Neuraltus trial, those participants who compared
their outcomes on PLM had a bigger chance of guessing correctly which treat-
ment they were receiving.
Drawing on both fieldwork conducted at PLM at the time of the disclosure of
the Neuraltus trial data on the platform and on secondary reporting, we want to
reflect on how patient activity coordinated over digital platforms can challenge
current drug testing standards and regimes of medical experimentation. Current
drug development and testing practice is vulnerable to many biases in trials ori-
ginating in pharmaceutical interests and dysfunctional regulation (Abraham &
Davis, 2013; Gøtzsche et al., 2013) but industry-sponsored tests are usually
well blinded (Hrobjartsson et al., 2014) and are often run by third-party contract
research organizations that have an interest in not meddling with the execution
of the protocol. The manipulation of experimental knowledge production is
mostly concentrated on the ways in which studies are designed (Dumit,
2012), approved and their results communicated (or better, are not – see
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Goldacre, 2013). With the emergence of digital platforms and powerful online
communication and coordination tools, patients have the means to easily share
information that might break any blinding device. For all the controversies of
the current testing regime, is there any experimental design that can provide
reliable outcomes about the safety and efficacy of drugs with unblinded
participants?
Patient participation in RCTs has usually been studied, in science and tech-
nology studies, from the standpoint of the legitimacy of patients’ concerns, and
how these concerns are neglected or constrained by the scientific or financial
interests that articulate trials (e.g. Epstein, 2007; Petryna, 2009). Citizen
science (including patient-led research – see Tempini & Del Savio, 2018) is
often vindicated as an alternative and more democratic model for the integration
of all these perspectives (Bonney et al., 2009; Follett & Strezov, 2015). Our case
study on PLM will allow us to introduce a note of caution about this approach.
As we will argue in the conclusion, the pharmaceutical industry has exploited all
opportunities in the past, including patients’ initiatives, to weaken the methodo-
logical constraints on drug testing. Without a new drug-testing standard that
accommodates patients’ preferences without bias, the eventual proliferation of
patient online initiatives may weaken even further the reliability of the RCT
regime but without a clear long-term benefit for the patients involved. And,
worryingly, initiatives organized on digital platforms could be vulnerable to
the new types of manipulation and interferences in public interest that have
recently attracted much concern (Sismondo, 2017).
In the next section, we will review the rationale for controlling the partici-
pants’ preferences in trials, and the reasons why patients are not always fully
aligned with the prescriptions of the protocol. In section 3, we reconstruct how
PLM gathered an online group of ALS patients who developed a series of out-
of-protocol initiatives around the NP001 trial. We also review how PLM
managed its position with respect to these controversial initiatives. They
chose not to discourage these patients or take an early position in favour of
protecting the NP001 trial. Free to coordinate on the platform, the initiatives
of the ALS patients around the Neuraltus trial yielded an unusual amount of
publicly accessible data for a phase II experimental drug, including other data
for related compounds that patients experimented with. Yet, the scientific
value of these data could not be vindicated by the subsequent analyses under-
taken both by patients and PLM researchers. In the fourth and final section,
we discuss the ethical self-justification of both PLM and the patients involved
in the data-sharing process, pitting it against our current understanding of
RCT biases and warning about the ability of the pharmaceutical industry to
exploit patients’ methodological requests to its own advantage. We conclude
our warning by pointing at the bigger picture in which it should be framed,
highlighting the links between this scenario and other recent examples
where internet networks were weaponised to orchestrate, manipulate and
capture the initiatives of active citizens, and undermine the construction of
facts.
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2. Preferences in clinical trial designs
RCTs are comparative experiments that pharmaceutical authorities all over the
world use to assess the safety and efficacy of medical treatments (Hackshaw,
2009). Established as the regulatory yardstick with the 1962 amendments to
the Federal Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Act, RCTs are designed to test the
hypothesis that there is no difference between the standard intervention and
an experimental treatment, randomly allocated to at least two groups of patients.
The size of the key phase III trial sample is calculated to reliably assess the
effects of both treatments and is usually big (hundreds or thousands of patients).
But phase III RCTs are just the third phase of a larger experiment. In phase I,
researchers find the appropriate dosage in a small group of healthy subjects,
investigating the toxicity and other pharmacological properties of the drug.
Phase II is a pilot for the RCT, with a small number of patients that rarely
allow the detection of statistically significant effects. Phase IV begins once the
treatment is approved for use, after two successful phase III RCTs; the
market is monitored for adverse effects that might not have been detected at
the previous stages.
RCTs, in phases I–III, are experimental designs with a central locus of
control: whoever plans the experiment creates a research protocol that all the
participants (physicians and patients alike) must meticulously follow. The pro-
tocol constrains the enactment of preferences that participants may hold regard-
ing the experiment. The treatment should be the only relevant difference
between the RCT’s arms. If we allow the preferences of participants to play a
role in the experiment, they will introduce a confounding factor in the compar-
ison (a bias). Physicians, for instance, usually have their own clinical judgement
about which patients could benefit more from the treatments under trial. If they
were to allocate treatments according to their views, the comparison would be
biased. This is why treatments are randomized in RCTs.
A trial is a ‘scientific experiment grounded in clinical design’ (Brives, 2013).
A trial participant should not expect to derive any personal health benefit from
the interventions under study, beyond that which s/he may reasonably expect
to derive from healthcare outside the trial. Hence, no set of patient preferences
will unambiguously lead to participation in RCTs and, indeed, 70 per cent of
clinical trials fail to recruit the desired number of participants. There is exten-
sive literature on the factors affecting patients’ preferences about trials; these
factors are multidimensional and, often, context-dependent (see, e.g. Bell &
Balneaves (2015) for a review focused on cancer trials). For instance, it seems
a consensus in this literature that many features in the methodological design
of the trial pose a barrier to patient participation; for instance, many patients
do not like randomization or placebos (see, e.g. Mills et al. (2006) for a
review, again on cancer RCTs). Most patients judge it better to receive a cus-
tomized prescription from a physician than a blind treatment allocation – and
to know which treatment they are receiving than to ignore it. Changing these
preferences is crucial for increasing participation in the trial and there is an
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active line of research in decision aid methods to get patients to articulate their
beliefs about trials in a way that does not hinder their participation (Gillies et al.,
2015).
However, patients often enrol spontaneously in a way that suggests a degree
of altruism: many patients are willing to suffer the inconveniences of a trial
despite the standard of care available (and that they could receive) outside the
experiment. This altruism has been broadly documented in the studies on
patient participation. It usually coexists with a degree of self-interest, which
is also extensively detected in the same studies. Following McCann, Campbell
and Entwistle (2010), we may rather speak of conditional altruism:
[A]lthough people may initially have a tendency to participate in a trial based on a
willingness to help others or contribute to a general good, this is unlikely to lead
to trial participation in practice unless people can also recognise that trial parti-
cipation can benefit (or at least not harm) themselves in ways that they regard as
salient. (McCann et al., 2010)
Conditional altruism seems to be context-dependent. There is at least prelimin-
ary evidence that patients with poor prognosis (e.g. less than a 10 per cent prob-
ability of 5-year cancer-free survival) report altruist motivations to enrol in trials
less often than those with better prognosis (Truong et al., 2011).
When trial participants enrol in a trial seeking access to the experimental
treatment and they come to believe, as the trial progresses, that they are not
receiving it, they tend to abandon the trial, damaging its statistical design. In
a review by Hrobjartsson et al. (2014), it was found that, for trials of more
than two weeks, the risk of patient dropout was 79 per cent higher in the
non-blinded control group as compared to the blinded control group. Blinding
patients about the treatment they receive (making the treatments under study as
similar as possible at least in their presentation and delivery) is a way to control
for behaviour motivated by this sort of conditionally altruistic preferences.3
Blinding can only be partial though for both ethical and methodological
reasons (Teira, 2013). In fields where deception was considered acceptable
for a while (e.g. social psychology), it was observed that deception could
trigger strategic interactions with the experimenter that may challenge the
very possibility of a test (Ortmann & Hertwig, 2002). For instance, Taylor
and Shepperd (1996) used deception to study the effectiveness of conventional
debriefing procedures for detecting the suspicion of deception among research
participants. In the experiment, the participants were told not to communicate if
the experimenter left the room. They did and found out that they had been, at
some point, deceived. Yet, the debriefing procedures did not make the partici-
pants reveal this fact. If the validity of the experiment’s outcome depends on
the, so to speak, innocence of the participants about the goals of the experiment,
not being able to detect their suspicions of deception threatens the interpreta-
tion of the results.
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In clinical trials, it is considered ethically unacceptable to deceive participants
and, therefore, the informed consent form and enrolment interviews will alert
patients about the different treatment options in a trial and the existence of
blinding mechanisms. Blinding can only be partial then.
From the standpoint of protocol compliance, participant preferences may
interfere with the conduct of a trial to three different degrees. Let us name
them as follows: mild, severe and fatal. For a start, we should notice that blinding
does not suppress these preferences: it just warrants, if successful, that they
shall have no systematic correlation with the outcome. The preferences of the
participants will put at stake the trial outcome if, knowing the former (prefer-
ences), it is possible to predict the latter (outcome). If blinding works properly,
there will be a small correlation at most, and hence a mild degree of interference.
The trial outcome will be reliable. If the blinding mechanism is not well imple-
mented or partially broken, there might a higher correlation between prefer-
ences and outcome. If patients find out that they are receiving their favourite
drug in a medical RCT, they may generate a placebo effect, making the drug
look more effective than it actually is;4 if they find out the opposite, they may
just drop out of the trial, diminishing its statistical power to detect the treatment
effect reliably. In this severe degree of interference, the trial outcome will not be
reliable but the experiment, as such, will be at least completed.
The fatal third degree of interference occurs when blinding cannot be
enforced and the participants can subvert the protocol to the point of making
the experiment unfeasible. Until very recently, the only documented case of
such severe interference was the AZT trials subverted by gay activist groups
such as ACT UP in the 1980s (Epstein, 1996). The AIDS patients taking
part in the trials had preferences about the interventions: they wanted to
receive the experimental treatment and not the placebo. They organized them-
selves to access the former; they swapped pills, took them to chemists for ana-
lysis, etc. At some point, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had to
accept that the trial was unfeasible since there was no way to control for the par-
ticipants’ preferences and gave patients advanced access to AZT.
Severe interferences become fatal when a significant subset of the participants
(or other actors involved in the trial) can coordinate themselves to break the
blinding and act against the protocol. The AZT trials illustrate how rare coor-
dination was in the pre-digital age; unlike most other trials, many of the parti-
cipants in the AZT trials had been gay right activists in the previous decade.
Before entering the trial, they were already part of a network operating to
defend their mutual interests and they just adapted it to serve their purposes
as trial participants. The case illustrates an important point about research pro-
tocols: they rely on the assumption that non-compliant patients will not reach a
degree of group coordination that allows them to breach the blinding mechan-
isms and other specific features of a trial protocol (e.g. constraints on treatment
regime, enrolment in other trials) (Zizzo, 2010). If, for instance, patients coor-
dinate their investigation about the treatment arms in which they are, they may
bias the outcome independently of the correctness of their guess; if a large
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enough number of patients in a trial arm form the same belief about the treat-
ment they are receiving (e.g. ‘we are all receiving the placebo’), even if false, it
might bias the outcome of the experiment in a predictable direction. There is
evidence that if patients think they are receiving their preferred treatment, its
effect rises – and the opposite. Of course, without a certain degree of coordina-
tion between patients, the formation of such beliefs will be entirely due to
chance (to the best of our knowledge).
Group coordination was unlikely in the pre-digital era. For most trial sub-
jects, it was too costly to get to know a significant number of their fellow par-
ticipants, least of all interact with them. Even in cases in which there has been
a degree of coordination, as those documented by Akrich, O’Donovan and
Rabeharisoa (2015), patients tend to ‘accept the language of “dominant”
actors’ and play by their rules (2015, p. 85). For instance, the French Muscu-
lar Dystrophy Association, as well as other French organizations for patients
with rare diseases, gather funds and orient the research process without inter-
fering in actual RCTs (see also Rabeharisoa & Callon, 2002). The Alzheimer
Society of Ireland has succeeded in including the patients’ perspective in eva-
luative studies of care technologies, previously only aimed at carers. More cri-
tical with standard medical approaches to childbirth, the French network
Collectif Interassociatif Autour de la Naissance (CIANE) has succeeded in
funding a research project on some of their hypotheses on postpartum hae-
morrhage that was published in the British Medical Journal in 2011 (Akrich
et al., 2015).
All these patients’ groups have successfully introduced new perspectives on
their conditions in an open exchange with biomedical researchers, often challen-
ging the received scientific wisdom. This is why, according to Akrich et al.
(2015, p. 86), their activism cannot be considered soft. As we are going to see
in the following section, the activity ensuing around the NP001 trial was
perhaps even ‘harder’: patients largely adopted the dominant language of the
RCTs (they promoted official RCT enrolment) and their methodological appa-
ratus (they organized a parallel experiment) while they broke the rules of the
official experiment, ‘hijacking’ it to their immediate advantage (cfr. Epstein,
1996). One may perhaps interpret this form of radicalization as a form of
individualism.5
Previous examples of ‘hard’ patient activism were built through institutional
networks and practices and long-developing ‘epistemic communities’ (Akrich,
2009). Both ACT UP and the four cases discussed in Akrich et al. (2015)
were organized as patients’ associations, often legally incorporated. The
advent of web platforms greatly reduces friction in distributed coordination
and communication, making it possible for ‘splinter’ groups to ephemerally
emerge around an individual interest that the members share.6 In RCTs, this
means that it can be enough for patients to be conditionally altruistic, in the
sense defined above, to generate the sort of situation at the centre of this
paper. Once digital coordination is possible, the feasibility of trials entirely
depends on the preferences of the participants. If a significant number of them
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choose to play against the protocol, as we are going to see next, fatal biases might
be simply impossible to prevent or correct.
The existing social contract in medical experimentation is not changing
because the scientific consensus has shifted to support different epistemic
standards, but because of a lack of enforcement. Whereas coordination was
too costly for most trial participants before the digital age, nowadays it is
within everybody’s reach with dedicated internet platforms where patients
can meet. Breaking the clauses of any experimental protocol is now easier
than ever before, and different social actors can use this power to force
their own priorities and epistemic standards onto the negotiating table. One
thing that will make the integration of their demands difficult, we observe,
is the absence of stable issue owners and reference organizations. The challen-
gers that can eventually emerge and throw a trial off the rails might remain
undetermined until the event.
3. NP001 and the web of unblinding
3.1. Methodology and stage setting
This paper draws on an embedded organizational ethnography of PLM. In Sep-
tember 2011, one of the authors (Tempini) arrived in Cambridge (Mass.) to
spend more than six months at the headquarters of PLM. The purpose was
to participate in research and development activities, offering help both on
pilot projects of potential future architectures and designs, and on PLM’s
current research projects, while simultaneously conducting the study. The
researcher acted as an independently resourced collaborator. No financial
exchange took place; Tempini collaborated in exchange for access and
freedom to document the life of the company. The general focus of the study
was on the development of a ‘universal’ infrastructure, to get a myriad of
patients to produce data that could be used in multiple and unspecified ways.
What kinds of patient knowledge, experience and meanings were represented,
for what uses and outputs? What were the interests of the patients, and of
other users, in the data? And what was the role of data in organizing this rela-
tionship? Documenting the different kinds of practices around data that differ-
ent parties, including PLM researchers and patients, were undertaking at the
same time was a primary operative principle of data collection.7
As a member of the R&D and Health Data Integrity teams, regular discussion
with PLM staff (from all teams) on the challenges the company was facing (both
from a systems design and development point of view) often led to a more general
commentary about the place of PLM in the broader landscape of actors, move-
ments, institutions and regulations. In particular, the staff often talked about
what sort of research could be carried out with the data contributed by the
patients and how the PLM website could be engineered in order to improve
patient involvement and data gathering. The tone of these exchanges was often
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revolutionary; just as many other digital companies had been disruptive in their
fields, PLM staff hoped to transform clinical research to make it faster, more
transparent and more participative. The company shared a strong sense,
steeped in personal experiences of activism and family histories of chronic and
life-changing conditions, of the necessity of taking into account the initiatives
of the patients on their site, learning from them and eventually supporting them.
The landmark event in this regard had been a ‘virtual trial’ of lithium carbo-
nate (Wicks et al., 2011) that eventually gave the network much publicity. Using
the communication and tracking tools of PLM, some ALS users on the site had
organized a coordinated study in which they self-administered lithium carbo-
nate and kept a public record of self-reports about its effects, in order to test
whether it slowed the progression of ALS. PLM staff had joined efforts to
help and standardize data collection and co-authored with the two patient-initia-
tive leaders a short interim report in Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (Wicks et al.,
2008), arguing for PLM’s potential to improve quality, safety of self-experimen-
tation, and time and cost efficiency over placebo-controlled trials. Later, PLM
staff developed an original method for analysing the data and published the
results of the data inNature Biotechnology (Wicks et al., 2011). The analysis dis-
confirmed an earlier randomized study of the compound published in Proceed-
ings of the National Academy of Sciences (Fornai et al., 2008). Eric Valor, the
leader of ACP whom we mentioned in the introduction, had been participating
in the lithium carbonate self-experimentation.
But the staff were also clearly aware that not all patient initiatives were equally
defensible on ethical, legal and scientific grounds, and they often discussed the
potential liabilities for PLM. A case in point had emerged soon before
Tempini’s arrival, in September 2011, at a time of growing public interest in
PLM as a potentially revolutionary model of medical research that was
bottom-up and participatory. On Tempini’s first day at the company headquar-
ters, he was introduced to the situation at the heart of this paper, presented by
an R&D staff member as an example of the sort of interactions between patients
that the site could incubate, and an intricate puzzle to solve for the company.
After that, the researcher took part in several meetings and discussions
related to these events due to PLM’s respect for both his research interest in
data practices and organizing and epistemic cultures, and the ongoing collabora-
tion with the organization.
The Neuraltus phase II trial of NP001 (from now on, simply the Neuraltus
trial), which was mentioned in the introduction, had started in February
2011. It was a two-arm double-blinded trial in which ALS patients were ran-
domly allocated either NP001 or a placebo. What eventually made this trial
unusual was that some of the participating patients were registered users of
PLM. Through the forums and the pages where patients record first-person
evaluations of treatments, some of the trial participants organized themselves
to try to find out which treatment they were receiving, whether it was NP001
or a placebo. In other words, they were explicitly breaching the trial protocol
with a concerted attempt at breaking its blinding.
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Through fall 2011 to spring 2012, the development was closely observed and
discussed within the company. As we show in what follows, the issue was
brought up in several meetings and also shared with visiting collaborators as a
problem directly linked to current trial designs. Patient leaders were keen to
directly involve PLM staff in a repeat of the lithium carbonate study collabora-
tion, but the staff was wary of the unclear implications of interfering with an
external trial (as opposed to supporting the bottom-up organization of a self-
organized one). The issue of the company’s own positioning with respect to
the NP001 initiatives was a sensitive concern until the end of the researcher’s
fieldwork period, and PLM took an official position only with the release on
Figshare of their analysis (discussed later) in October 2012. This was then fol-
lowed by other publications.
The analysis we present builds on primary data in the form of written notes
from both spontaneous conversations and meetings that the researcher directly
participated in, and a selection of interviews (semi-structured, customized for
each interviewee and ranging across a number of topics). Due to the sensitive
nature of the company’s concerns at the time, the researcher felt it sensible to
pose direct questions in an interview only in a limited number of occasions
and only for management-level employees. This primary material is well
poised to discuss concerns that staff members had in trying to formulate the
company’s position with respect to the initiatives, and their interpretations of
the patients’ actions.
The patient leaders’ perspectives have instead been constructed from a
wealth of secondary data, including published scientific reports and articles,
and a variety of online resources, including: blogs written by the patient
leaders themselves about the experimentation initiatives and their research on
NP001; posts published on the PLM platform; newspaper articles featuring
initiative leader interviews; and other internet resources (some recovered with
the internet Archive’s Wayback Machine, for correct temporal reconstruction
of events or if otherwise unavailable). The perspective of the pharmaceutical
company Neuraltus has not been directly documented but, where relevant,
we refer to secondary resources that report their interactions with the initiative
leaders.
3.2. Persevering’s initiative at PLM
The patient leader in the unblinding initiative was known for his username: Per-
severing (his real name was Rob Tison). As opposed to Eric Valor, who was ineli-
gible for the Neuraltus trial, Persevering was himself a participant. He started
reporting on PLM in July 2011 (the NP001 phase II trial ran from February
2011 to September 2012), and then decided to organize the other participants
registered on PLM so that they could find out which treatment they received.
Like the patients in the early AZT trials in the 1980s, some of the PLM users
who joined Persevering in breaking away from the Neuraltus research protocol
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had a track record of networked actions: they had taken part in the virtual trial of
lithium carbonate and knew what they could jointly achieve.
These patients replicated the trial data collection both to discover the trial
arm they belonged to, and to anticipate official results. For this, they would
mainly use a standard Patient-Reported Outcome tool already available on the
site, the ALSFRS-R questionnaire: this is a functional rating scale that provides
a 0–48 score of disease progression based on the assessment of voluntary motion
function. The ALSFRS-R is a widely used standard in ALS and was being used
in the Neuraltus trial as a measure of clinical outcome, so two measurements
were taken for each participant: one was filled in by the patient and was publicly
accessible as soon as it was completed through PLM, whereas the other one was
deposited in the Neuraltus trial record, awaiting further analysis.
Importantly, both versions of the data on NP001 are proprietary. The mono-
poly of the trial data is controlled by the NP001 trial sponsor, Neuraltus. The
PLM data monopoly is controlled by the sponsoring organization (PatientsLi-
keMe Inc.), which exploits the data for the commercial and scientific research
projects that fund the development of the platform. Simultaneously, it shares
them with the patients in a controlled fashion and with the main aim of facilitat-
ing the satisfaction of their own health information needs and peer social inter-
action. The data that patients indeed access about themselves and other patients
on PLM are consumed through webpages replete with visualizations, filters and
counts, designed to satisfy the information needs that users may have to under-
stand their own or others’ health situation, and to structure and foster social
interaction. Patients cannot access and research the ‘source’ data on their
own. The research use of the data collected through the platform is limited
by the terms and conditions that users accept upon signing up to authorized
projects and partnerships.
Persevering collected and aggregated the ALSFRS-R scores as they became
available on the website, plus any additional information shared through
other treatment evaluation questionnaires that the participants filled out on
the site, by manually ‘scraping’8 the data from the webpages. Soon after the
unblinding process started in the summer of 2011, Persevering contacted the
staff at PLM to share his project with them. Unlike in the lithium carbonate
virtual trial, here the PLM staff was concerned with the scientific rationale of
the initiative. The patients’ reasoning assumed that any effect they could regis-
ter on the questionnaires was most likely caused by the active treatment
(NP001), be it in the form of self-registered improvement or any other side
effects. Consequently, they were trying to devise the composition of the treat-
ment and the placebo arms of the trial by grouping together patients with nor-
mally uncommon, yet repeated side effects, and putatively attributing them to
the treatment arm. What they were doing was ‘like shooting an arrow at a
blank wall and then drawing a target around it after the arrow has already
landed’, as one staff member put it to the ethnographer. Moreover, as Akst
(2016) reports, Persevering had unblinded his own trial treatment once in the
clinic where NP001 was administered, by smuggling his and other patients’
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empty treatment containers from the clinic (with some guesswork as to the attri-
bution of each bag to each patient), then analysing them for pH, to conclude that
he was on the treatment arm.
Importantly, Persevering and several others experienced dramatic reversals,
temporarily recovering functional capacity soon after injection, though the
positive effects became increasingly ephemeral and waned over time. The exci-
tement was high but so were the doubts. The PLM staff was cautious; they
knew that the progressive loss of function in ALS is S-shaped rather than
linear, so apparent improvement can just be part of the normal course of
disease progression. Still, as part of the evaluation of the situation, the staff
undertook an informal, preliminary statistical analysis to assess the purported
effects of NP001. At this early stage, a positive outcome seemed possible, albeit
on unreliable grounds (a small sample and a fluctuating condition). The staff
member who initially introduced the ethnographer to the situation highlighted
uncertainty as to what PLM should do: ‘You don’t know what unintended con-
sequences that could have in the scenario of a clinical trial. I’m not saying that’s
necessarily a bad thing but I’m saying the medical world is not equipped to deal
with that right now. So I think it’s very different [to the previous study of
lithium-carbonate]’. In several conversations, staff members shared the convic-
tion that this situation could repeat itself on many other social media and web
platforms other than PLM. PLM staff felt that they were witnessing a major
development that was facilitated by the PLM platform better than any other,
yet not dependent on it. Patients could have easily grouped and coordinated
elsewhere. In a meeting with an external expert, focusing on the problem of
including the patient perspective in better patient-reported outcome research,
one member of staff put it this way: ‘we have partially created the world that he
needs to do that, but he doesn’t need us, he can use the hashtag NP001 on
Twitter’. As a matter of fact, the patients in Eric Valor’s parallel ACP initiative
were relying on an external Google site for sharing protocol, calculating dosage
and coordinating data gathering.
It was difficult for PLM to evaluate this dilemma. Staff was aware that their
site was being used for an initiative that could disrupt the Neuraltus trial, and
for which the ethical and legal liabilities were unclear. There was concern
about the potential damage to research that this initiative could cause. At the
same time, other considerations sympathetic to the spirit of empowerment,
group support and empathy of the initiative pointed at a potential conflict of
interest: supporting patient communication, learning and empowerment is a
main value proposition of the platform, and for PLM staff to conduct health
research with patient data is important also for its reputation and future partner-
ship prospects. And yet other potential conflicts of interests were highlighted to
the ethnographer: if PLM had advanced access (even if limited) to the trial
outcome, and decided to invest in Neuraltus, would this constitute some sort
of insider trading?9 One can easily speculate further and imagine other potential
beneficiaries of this potential future information asymmetry (patients, trial
sponsor, any observing third party).
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Persevering’s initiative sparked a debate that reverberated all over the
company in the fall of 2011. The issue was brought up in several meetings,
so most staff members became aware of it. PLM staff kept in communication
with the patient leaders, while they tried to understand if there could be
some sort of compromise, allowing patients to gather information (and ‘not
leave them in the dark’) without disrupting the Neuraltus trial. The issue was
also discussed with relevant external collaborators who could help the
company manage the situation. Two points stood out in all these exchanges.
First, PLM staff felt the necessity of articulating a general company position
regarding this sort of initiative, and that they could not simply be banned. While
patients could make use of any social network to revolt against a trial protocol,
PLMmade such disruption easier. The responses to ASFRS-R and other ques-
tionnaires were so easily accessible that any site user could, in principle, find
them and harvest the data without any patient coordination or engagement.
This level of accessibility of health information was crucial to the company’s
mission: to conduct health research with patient-reported data, on the basis
of a policy of patient empowerment. PLM wanted patients to have shared
access to the information they reported in order to best serve their perceived
needs. In this regard, Persevering’s initiative was an inevitable side effect of
the core architecture of PLM. It could not be aborted without damaging the
company’s value proposition statement (and related market position). In addi-
tion to this, several patients participating in either one of the NP001 initiatives
had been members of the lithium carbonate study; at least in part, they were re-
enacting a way to organize patient research that had been previously officially
experimented with on PLM.
Second, the staff quickly grasped the potential epistemic conflict between
Persevering’s initiative and the Neuraltus trial: the more information the patients
gathered about the latter, the more likely it was that the trial yielded a biased
(unblinded) outcome. But the conflict was not a zero-sum situation. A shared
understanding was that this initiative was not research for science’s sake but a
quest for patients to save their lives. Seen from this ‘oblique’ perspective, the
conflict was more difficult to judge. One staff member shared this point of
view in a meeting as: ‘[Persevering] he’s not trying to unblind it […] they
have a sense of urgency that we cannot understand’. A colleague added:
‘Also, they got to know each other, […] they want to know how each other is
doing’. Many of these reflections drew from the staff member’s own personal
histories. The Heywood brothers, founders of the platform, had a background
in patient activism (founding the ALS Therapy Development Institute, a non-
profit) and what had once been called ‘guerrilla science.’ Through their painful
family history, they were familiar with how patients were thinking about their
own chances in leading this initiative.
Overall, PLM challenged a central assumption in the current bioethical con-
sensus on clinical trials: the primary goal of participation in a trial is to study
potential treatments, not to find a cure for the individual participants (the con-
trary is the so-called therapeutic misconception). For more than five decades after
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the 1962 Act, publicly and privately sponsored RCTs had been organized on
this assumption, arguably against the preference of many trial participants. As
far as we can tell, PLM became the first private company willing to take a
stance on the attempt of patients to break free of research protocols and
support the argument that the current research regime did not fit the needs
of the patients (while also voicing concern about its risks for the regime of clin-
ical research), which Eric Valor, among others, has vocally shared.
In the meanwhile, patients were not standing by and looking. As journalist
Akst reports in detail in a short self-published e-book (Akst, 2016), among
the forum discussions that patients were having in relation to NP001, a conver-
sation ensued about an antecedent drug also based on sodium chlorite, WF10,
about its links and similarity with NP001, and about how to source it. Patients
were concerned about securing their continued access to the drug after the trial
end, and Neuraltus was reportedly aware of these forum threads. Patients
lobbied the company and led a petition, signed by 18,000 supporters, for an
expanded access programme. Neuraltus refused, on grounds of the financial
cost and the delay in the approval process that extended access would have
caused.
WF10 was available from Thailand, but patients had to coordinate to help
and fend off quacks and fraudsters. A few were able to face the steep costs
(in the region of $10,000–$20,000 for a year’s worth of provision), others
resorted to industrial grade sodium chlorite – following Valor who, as we
anticipated in the beginning of this paper, had devised a way to intake the che-
mical orally and was interested in enrolling others to experiment and share out-
comes as well. Akst (2016) explains how Persevering was able to procure himself
WF10, thanks to the generosity of Ben Harris (akaHappy Physicist), fellow par-
ticipant in NP001 and another leading figure of the NP001 patient initiative,
who shared his stock. Hope had been wearing thinner, as already during the
trial the reversals that patients had initially experienced had started to have
smaller effect and shorter duration. Some patients, including Ben Harris,
broke the trial protocol again and did not wait for the three months of after-
treatment observation to end. After consuming the WF10 orally to little
avail, Persevering became disillusioned. In September 2012, he stopped
eating and drinking and let himself die. Ben Harris, who had devised a way
to take sodium chlorite intravenously, consumed WF10 in this way and contin-
ued to inject himself with industrial grade sodium chlorite to stay closer to the
trial drug’s delivery mechanism and bypass concerns about the absorption of
the chemical through the digestive system. When he surrendered, in August
2013, he chose to die in the same way as his friend (Akst, 2016). The excruciat-
ing experience that patients with ALS go through can lead them to bravely (if
dangerously) pursue a hopeful vision with seemingly inexhaustible energy for
many years, but can also exhaust them, beneath the surface, until they lose all
will to continue.10
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3.3. One trial, many analyses
Access to the raw data generated in a clinical trial is a source of endless contro-
versy. Pharmaceutical companies should submit their data sets to the regulatory
agencies for the approval of new treatments, on the basis of treatment safety and
efficacy. Other than for regulatory approval, pharmaceutical companies rarely
release the data of the RCTs they sponsor, despite their potential scientific
interest.11 In the Neuraltus trial, we find patients, instead of researchers, orga-
nizing to access the data and find out about the efficacy of a treatment in a trial
through two highly unusual paths.
On the one hand, Persevering’s initiative disclosed through PLM a self-
reported sample of the Neuraltus trial data. On the other hand, Valor’s ACP
organized a virtual trial of a substance the patients considered a proxy for
NP001, an oral solution of sodium chlorite. At the end of both the real trial
(Neuraltus) and the virtual trial (ACP), there were three competing data sets
on at least three preparations or drugs (see Figure 1): 1) the Neuraltus complete
data on a) NP001; 2) PLM’s data on a) NP001 (partially disclosed through Per-
severing’s initiative) and sodium chlorite homebrews in both b) oral and c) intra-
venous solutions; 3) the ACP data on the b) sodium chlorite oral solution. The
Neuraltus trial data were only accessible for the company’s scientists; the latter
two data sets were publicly accessible online.
Three main analyses of these three data sets were eventually conducted. 1)
Persevering presented his own statistical discussion of the data he had collected
through PLM (Persevering, 2012). 2) Researchers at PLM published their own
independent report, which included an analysis of both the sodium chlorite oral
solution homebrew and NP001, together with a re-analysis of the previous
lithium carbonate study and an analysis of data about another recent ALS
Figure 1. A visual summary of the many initiatives around the NP001 trial.
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trial (dexpramipexole) that were also available through PLM (Wicks et al.,
2012). Finally, 3) Neuraltus published a standard statistical analysis of its own
trial outcome (Miller et al., 2015). The ACP did not release a formal analysis
of its own data.
The ACP was a mixture of phase I and phase II trials. As in a phase I trial,
patients had been experimenting with composition and dosage. They kept a
record of their homebrew solutions, trying increasingly higher doses to test
their own tolerance to the side effects – which were sometimes taxing. They
also kept a rich, detailed record of their perceived clinical effects, as if it were
a phase II trial. They shared visual data in the form of photographs and
videos (via YouTube) as evidence of speech and limb movement functions.
Arguably, the lack of homogeneity in treatment regimes, duration and data col-
lection, as well as the overall low number of participants, would have made the
data difficult to analyse with standard statistical techniques.
Three months after the completion date of the Neuraltus trial, on 8 January
2012, Persevering published a guest post on Eric Valor’s blog (Persevering,
2012). He had gathered data from 34 PLM users on the NP001 trial, which
amounted to about one third of the official trial’s sample. Persevering assigned
his patients to the two arms of the NP001 trial depending on their self-reported
side effects, under the assumption that some of these would signal the adminis-
tration of the active treatment. He then found a statistically significant difference
between the means of the outcome variable ALSFRS-R in the two groups,
showing that NP001 apparently brought about a self-reported improvement,
stopping the progression of the disease. However, a self-selected sample of that
size does not allow for a reliable statistical estimation of the treatment effect;
such an improvement may also be due to the natural progression of the disease.12
Despite their awareness of such methodological pitfalls, the PLM researchers
also contributed their analysis of both the ACP and Persevering’s data (after the
end of the Neuraltus trial). The report, they argued, highlighted a void around
the ethics of patient and corporate initiatives outside trial:
Should our analysis of this data on unproven therapies be provided to the
patients and clinicians treating them or should it remain in our servers until it
reaches the significance or scientific rigor required for submission to a peer-
reviewed journal? What questions should guide our decision about sharing our
conclusions? (Wicks et al., 2012, p. 5)
The data alone certainly did not justify it. Their analysis was, in both cases,
inconclusive. The mean difference between the inferred trial groups suggested
that NP001 somewhat slowed the progression of ALS, but it was not statistically
significant. Only a complete analysis of the Neuraltus trial, they warned, could
settle the matter. As for the sodium chlorite oral solution homebrew data, the
PLM analysis showed that it was actually worsening the disease progression
and causing harm to patients. The quality of the evidence grounding this
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conclusion was poor, since the data had been generated with a scarcely con-
trolled research protocol and very few patients.
At the same time, PLM researchers were keenly aware of the risks entailed in
Persevering’s initiative. They pointed out that the release of a defective preliminary
data analysis might be damaging for actual and future trials; the participants may
stop their treatments if they believe them ineffective or not enrol in any subsequent
trial. And the intake of homebrew solutions can harm and introduce bias in the trial
if it happens during the study period. Why then did PLM decide not to take an
early position against Persevering’s unblinding initiative, and instead contribute
their own analysis of his data after the trial’s end? The PLM researchers instead
used the report to open up a more general debate about whether patient-
powered digital platforms are contributing to the public good or not:
Open data architectures, the Internet, education, empowerment of patients, and
what appears to be a frustratingly slow pace of clinical innovation have all com-
bined to bring us to where we are today. It is important to determine whether
models such as ours can hasten this process or be deployed to investigate the
“real world” efficacy of treatments that have already been approved. Or, as
may be the case, whether such contributions merely add confusion to the mix.
(Wicks et al., 2012, p. 12)
PLM researchers defended the potential value of learning from self-reported
information alongside clinical trials. They made a distinction between publishing
about a trial before the official results were released (i.e. publishing about NP001),
and publishing about the patient self-experimentation that was happening because
of the trial (i.e. publishing about the sodium chlorite homebrew). Acknowledging
that the first could be seen as an outright disruption, they defended their own
publication of the second for the opportunity to reduce harm.
It was only a few years later that the official outcome of the Neuraltus NP001
trials became available, in September 2014 through Amyotrophic Lateral Sclero-
sis and Frontotemporal Degeneration for the phase I trial, and April 2015 through
Neurology – Neuroimmunology Neuroinflammation for the phase II trial that the
patient initiatives paralleled. No statistically significant difference was found
between the NP001 and the placebo group, regarding the primary outcome vari-
able (the ASFRS decline slope) and the secondary variables. A subgroup analy-
sis revealed that NP001 seemed to have some positive effects on patients with
higher cytokine inflammation who were testing the higher dose (Miller et al.,
2015). Neuraltus organized a second phase II trial, currently in progress, to
find out more about the efficacy of NP001 on this particular class of patients.
4. The future of clinical trials
The preferences of the pharmaceutical industry are the source of many different
biases in the trials it sponsors. Dumit’s work (2012) shows how much of the
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focus of the industry is on the construction of conditions for the management of
which drugs can be tested and then marketed. Trials can be biased, not so much
for the statistical mechanisms with which evidence is evaluated, but in the way
they define target populations, conditions and interventions, and how samples
are consequently constructed so as to maximize the chances of success. And
indeed, it is more likely that experimental treatments test positive in an indus-
try-sponsored (published) RCT than in publicly sponsored trials (Lundh et al.,
2012). In addition, the sponsor may decide to report only positive findings
(focusing only on a sample of the trial data) or just submit successful trials,
neglecting failures. In any case, the financial incentive for the bias is clear:
new treatments come with fresh patents for the sponsor to exploit. However,
the same sort of meta-analyses that detect sponsor biases argue that industry-
sponsored trials are conducted with strong methodological precautions (e.g.
patients are regularly blinded in order to prevent biases originating in their pre-
ferences – Savovic et al., 2012). There is a clear incentive for the industry to be
this careful: if positive, the experiment should persuade the regulator that the
new compound is safe and effective. Hence, so far, the pharmaceutical industry
has found itself in a position not to have any reason to accommodate the parti-
cipants’ preferences when they conflict with the trial blinding requirements.
Even if it was an early stage trial, Neuraltus probably would have wanted the
NP001 trial blind, lest any positive results be turned down as spurious by the
regulator.
4.1. Digital technology and contract research organization
Our case study illustrates a different understanding of industry biases. Whereas
the interests of the trial participants and the pharmaceutical companies, as far as
blinding is concerned, are often not aligned, a different convergence ensues
between the business model of platforms such as PLM and the preferences
about blinding of some of the participants in the NP001 trial. Digital commu-
nication and socialization platforms such as PLM depend on the sharing of data
by their users, and the ability to support their interaction and coordination
needs. As we saw, PLM found itself in a peculiar position, hosting Persevering’s
initiative even if it created a conflict between the goals of PLM and Neuraltus.13
PLM could not take a stance against Persevering’s initiative without risking
damage to its main business asset: an active community of patients willing to
share data about their health. These initiatives can make leader users influential,
and alienating them can be particularly risky in this respect. If unblinding a trial
is a potential source of bias, we may see in Persevering’s initiative the grounds for
a different industry-powered bias: the interested industry in this case is not the
pharmaceutical but technology, or rather, that blurry space that social media
companies occupy.14 Interestingly, PLM does not make money through the
sale of ads (unlike Facebook) but through research services, primarily to the
pharmaceutical industry. In a research landscape where RCTs have been
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increasingly organized and managed by third-party contract research organiza-
tions such as IQVIA (formerly Quintiles), the potential damage to the stability of
the RCT as a testing regime, as a consequence of the emergence of digital plat-
forms for self-reported observational studies, pitches the financial interests of
one kind of research services firm against another rather starkly. PatientsLikeMe
has indeed made early moves towards the provision of clinical trial support, by
collaborating and providing research infrastructure on a trial of a diet supple-
ment, Lunasin, organized in collaboration with Duke University’s ALS
Clinic (Bedlack, 2015).
As we mentioned, there were a number of other reasons shaping PLM’s view
not to undermine the initiative. On the one hand, a widespread belief in the man-
agers’ powerlessness to block the initiative reduced the possibilities for dissent to
public positioning. Staff believed they lacked the means to fully enforce any such
action, as patients could move the initiative to other digital tools such as the ones
employed by Valor’s own ACP: Google Sites, Google Spreadsheets and general-
purpose broadcasting and coordination tools such as forums, Twitter or Face-
book. On the other hand, PLM was tied up with ALS activism since its found-
ing, and the network had actively collaborated with the patient community in the
previous lithium carbonate study. While they did not collaborate in the NP001
initiative, they sympathized with the human struggle for life motivating the
mission as they observed Persevering coordinate his action. In a letter to the
British Medical Journal, compellingly titled ‘Subjects no more: What happens
when trial participants realise they hold the power?’ and published two years
after the NP001 events, PLM researchers discussed the NP001 events further
and asked to ‘forge a new social contract that maximizes both scientific discovery
and patient autonomy, setting the stage for better trials with more engaged par-
ticipants’ (Wicks et al., 2014). This will be necessary to reduce the risk of revolt
against the protocol – ‘patient-led “disobedience”’ (Wicks et al., 2014). The solu-
tion PLM suggested is to involve patients in trial design and organization, and
make them active collaborators in clinical research. Persevering and Happy Phy-
sicist saw themselves as supporters, not saboteurs, of the NP001 programme:
they actively helped the organizers to enrol patients, spreading the news of a pro-
mising trial (Akst, 2016). Even though their own initiative depended on success-
ful enrolment (to run the trial, and to achieve good sample size), they were not
scheming against Neuraltus. They hoped to live long enough to access the drug
once approved. Valor, for his part, saw no direct conflict between his self-experi-
mentation initiative and standard trials: ‘[W ]we have no delusion that anything
we are doing is intended to replace clinical trials. Rather, we intend to augment
and push forward the actual science’ (Valor, 2012).
4.2. Digital technology and informal activism
In a digital world of fluid, distributed communications, where small initiatives
can emerge and coordinate at the fringes of bigger, better-resourced enterprises
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such as a clinical trial, trial participants can feel like research collaborators and
yet breach the trial protocol. It might be tempting to dismiss this story as a
unique case, but we believe that the repeat of this experience is not an unlikely
scenario. In the 1980s, very few trial participants could reach the degree of coor-
dination in their actions exhibited by the ACT UP activists, who relied on the
pre-existing political networks of gay activists (Epstein, 1996). As far as we can
tell, after the AZT trial, there was no other organized attempt to breach a trial
protocol on the same scale. Nowadays, digital platforms allow almost every
group of patients to meet and organize, if they wish, to coordinate action in
trials. Platforms greatly reduce friction in distributed coordination and commu-
nication, making it possible for ‘splinter’ groups of individuals facing an extreme
challenge to ephemerally15 emerge and disappear; users can quickly find each
other, coordinate as long as they share the same individual interests, and
disband.
These groups do not need to be affiliated to formal organizations. On the con-
trary, if their purposes are controversial, they might better not be like a formal
group or organization; rather, to work as understated individuals contingently
helping each other might be more convenient. It has been well observed how
digital environments allow ‘pro-ana’ groups (support and self-construction in
favour of anorexia) to grow on the internet against all adversities (Shirky,
2008; cf. Vellar, 2018). The plight of the patient initiatives we discuss is
much less controversial and at least in part legitimized by discourses of self-
empowerment and challenge to power. What is most controversial is that the
methodological consequences of their actions (potential lethal interference with
an RCT protocol; generation of worse-quality alternative evidence; probable
harm to homebrew testers) were so counterproductive. These web-based initia-
tives can arise in the absence of a mandate (or pretence thereof) of an activist
organization, evolve very quickly, multiply (Persevering’s NP001 data collection,
Valor’s ACP project,Happy Physicist’s intravenous solution experiment), cross-
over (e.g. Persevering switching to oral solution homebrew after NP001), and
generate self-experimentation activity that does not always leave a conclusive
data trail.
Web-based collaborative tools not only offer networking and coordination
capabilities (finding similar people, coordinating with them), but they also
allow easy generation, computation and analysis of new kinds of data (e.g.
Google Forms, Google Spreadsheets, etc.), the standards of which (what is
data about, how it needs to be produced, what can it be evidence for) have
been agreed extemporaneously. These initiatives mobilize statistical knowledge,
techniques and discourses in ways similar to those observed in studies of data
activism in domains other than science (Bruno et al., 2014; Milan & van der
Velden, 2016), although, in our case, patients are not mainly involved in resis-
tance to the state or corporates, nor in making an issue visible and relevant,
despite elements of these drivers being clearly at play. They are about curing
oneself. Generating new knowledge (does homebrew work?) or uncovering
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other knowledge (does NP001 work?) are means to that end. Activists abandon
the task once they have answered these questions.
And again, without being absorbed into the structure of formal organizations,
patients are able to operationalize these questions over and over again, to pursue
new hypotheses. The material legacy of previous experiences is distributed over
a number of digital platforms interconnected by the web, and their organization
and leadership skills – along with scientific expertise – allow them to move from
one self-organized experiment to another. The NP001 initiatives were led by
patients who had previously participated in the lithium carbonate experiment;
simultaneously to the NP001 experiments, the data of another trial were also
shared on the platform (Wicks et al., 2012) and Valor has taken part in
patient-led experiments on two other (not patented) compounds, before and
after ACP: ursodeoxycholic acid and fisetin (ALSFisetin, 2013; ALSURSO,
2010). This hybrid repertoire of political and scientific practices can be re-
deployed informally and repeated several times without coalescing into a
formal organizational structure.
Might the genie be out of the bottle? The development of a culture and
expertise where patients are free to generate epistemic evidence about com-
pounds, regardless of whether they are currently being tested in trials or
freely available, is here. But crucially, epistemic conflicts, such as the one we
have documented, risk generating a situation where no reliable evidence is avail-
able. The more information patients gathered about the trial, the more likely it
was that the trial would yield a biased outcome. In the end, patient-led analyses
were inconclusive, while the trial was potentially biased, its statistical power
weakened, and led to a phase IIb only several years after the first.
4.3. Digital technology and pharmaceutical regulation
A pressure seems to be mounting in the online world to make the social contract
of blinding increasingly unpalatable, as it becomes easier to break it. Here, the
crux of the matter becomes the trial methodology: the consensus among trialists
today requires participants’ blinding in most tests as a necessary condition for an
unbiased outcome. If a testing method was found, as reliable as the RCT, in
which the patients could express their preferences without biasing the results,
there would be no problem in patients sharing their data however they
wished. Short of this, NP001-like scenarios may undermine the reliability of
many RCTs.
An obvious rejoinder is to challenge the reliability of RCTs as a testing stan-
dard. Many philosophers of science have questioned, during the last decade, the
superiority of RCTs to grasp causal connections; STS scholars have argued
against a method that pharmaceutical interests bend so easily (e.g. Bell, 2017).
Maybe it is time for change and, indeed, there are clear signs that it is about
to happen. On 13 December 2016, the 21st Century Cures Act was signed
into law, an ambitious bill aimed at reforming biomedical research in the
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United States with the goal of bringing new treatments faster to patients. It
quite radically changes the regulatory standards adopted in the 1962 Act, invit-
ing the FDA to use ‘alternative statistical methods’ (section 2061) and ‘evidence
from clinical experience (in place of evidence from clinical trials)’ (section 2062)
in order to support approval of a drug for new medical use (indication).16
Just as the 1962 Act created the clinical trial industry by requesting two positive
RCTs in every new drug application, we may expect that the implementation of
the 21st Century Cures Act will create new testing standards where the partici-
pants’ preferences will be better accommodated. On the basis of these new stan-
dards, the FDA will authorize new treatments in pharmaceutical markets.
Perhaps new reliable standards will emerge but, in negotiating any new social
contract for clinical trials, all the stakeholders (and patients, in particular) should
bear in mind the fate of the FDA advanced access programme. In response to
ACT UP’s demands, the FDA inaugurated an advanced access system for
certain drugs (Carpenter, 2010), which were approved on the basis of shorter
RCTs. Trials were shortened using surrogate outcomes (González-Moreno
et al., 2015): if the variable indicating the success of a treatment took many
years to track, the trial would instead target another variable whose value at
an earlier date should predict the treatment outcome. Even if the original inten-
tion of this methodological shift might have been to accommodate the patients’
legitimate preferences, the pharmaceutical industry has exploited it for its own
purposes with a self-serving choice of surrogate outcomes. Positive trials based
on these early end points have served to obtain regulatory approval and bring
into the pharmaceutical market treatments of inferior quality.
No wonder then a former ACT UP activist reacted against the 21st Century
Cures Act, in an early opinion piece published in the New York Times. Gregg
Gonsalves and co-authors warned that the Act ‘could substantially lower the
standards for approval of many medical products, potentially placing patients
at unnecessary risk of injury or death’ (Gonsalves et al., 2015; see also Gonsalves
et al., 2016). Just after the approval of the Act, scientists warned about the
potential regulatory mistakes that might follow from using evidence where
sources of bias are not properly controlled for (Sherman et al., 2016).
In a connected yet distributed world, spontaneous coordination over digital
platforms such as PLM is the norm and NP001-like scenarios may become
common, where patients share live information about all forms of medical experi-
mentation. Perhaps most worrying is that, while it might seem that the possibility
of breaking the clauses of any experimental protocol can allow different social
actors to use this power to force their own priorities and epistemic standards
onto the negotiating table, these initiatives by themselves do not leave behind
stable issue owners and reference organizations capable of articulating and advo-
cating patients’ methodological preferences – if the door was left open to them.
There is a possibility that new challengers that can eventually emerge and
throw a trial off the rails might remain undetermined until the event.
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4.4. Coda
We do not know yet if a new epistemic regime is emerging where digital plat-
forms will feature as a source of personal health data and of logistical support for
observational research, alongside electronic health records and other databases,
at the expenses of traditional (blinded) RCTs. Notably, the problems that we
singled out in this paper are problems that emerge as people share information,
not hide it (as in RCTs’ reporting bias). And yet, late developments in the digital
public sphere offer further grounds for worry about the proliferation of digital
noise and the ways in which industries and heterogeneous interests can exploit
it. Just recently, internet platforms have been repeatedly weaponised to orches-
trate, influence and capture the initiatives of active citizens, undermining the
practices by which facts are constructed, shared and become the bedrock of a
healthy democracy (Sismondo, 2017). The world of self-organized and sponta-
neous digital interaction is now questioned for being dangerously, and inadver-
tently, open to the influence of organizations with well-defined agendas. What
would happen if the strategies of social media influence, with their celebrity
dynamics, polarizing bots and fake news farms were to be introduced in the
world of digital patient groups? This might sound like far-fetched speculation,
but reports on the 2016 votes (both the US presidential election and the Brexit
referendum) suggest that a relatively small number of targeted interventions
might multiply many times in online echo chambers. In the world of patient par-
ticipation and pharmaceutical innovation, the specific forms these influencing
strategies might take are undefined as much as are their outcomes, but it is
not difficult to imagine they could allow their perpetrators to sabotage a compe-
titor’s trial, or to gain insight into their industrial trade secrets. Seeing whether a
drug shows early signs of efficacy before they are made public may also allow
investors to buy shares of the manufacturing company at a better price.
The disappointment of groups that feel left behind can be genuine and very
well justified. But it can still be manipulated and seized upon, even in ways that
can ultimately harm the very protesters and that could be difficult to defeat.
Paradoxically, in the world of medical research, it might be that those commu-
nities that could have the most to gain, the orphan diseases’ communities, risk
losing the most. If noise were to proliferate further along the lines we have indi-
cated, the availability of new life-saving therapies might be further delayed.
Where this imaginative scenario leaves us is difficult to tell, but we hope to gen-
erate a stimulating discussion.
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Notes
1 Valor had reviewed scientific papers on an antecedent compound, WP10, and patents
registered by lead developers of the drug. He also personally corresponded with one lead
developer. And he was right to think that the drug was based on sodium chlorite, as it was
later confirmed (among other sources) by the research articles reporting on the outcomes of
the NP001 clinical trials (Miller et al., 2014, 2015). NP001 is, however, based on a highly
purified, pH-adjusted secret formulation, and was delivered intravenously in the trial.
2 Sodium chlorite, often used in water treatment plants as a cleaner, is inexpensive and
easy to source in an industrial grade form.
3 In the previous paragraphs, we draw from quantitative and qualitative social research
on trial participation. There are few STS studies that deal with patients’ preferences
regarding trial protocols but their diagnoses are sometimes more radical than what we
characterize as ‘conditional altruism’. For example, in Jill Fisher’s ethnography of the
companies conducting RCTs, we find that patients behave as ‘neoliberal subjects moti-
vated by their social and economic positions to benefit the best they can from the system
of drug development’ (Fisher, 2009, p. 178) And this is why they often deviate from the
research protocols. At any rate, for successful protocol compliance, it is necessary that
patients acquire an entirely new set of skills, practices and responsibilities as they
‘become actors in the experiment’ (Brives, 2013, p. 406) and participate in ‘their very
construction as objects of biomedical research’ (2013, p. 410).
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4 At least in terms of subjectively reported outcomes, such as pain (Hrobjartsson &
Gotzsche, 2010). The necessity of blinding for other trial outcomes may vary (Teira,
2013).
5 We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this interpretative key.
6 In this regard, as another reviewer suggests, these patients would be more like the
self-interested paid participants that nowadays proliferate in industry-sponsored trials
(Monahan & Fisher, 2015). Nonetheless, we believe that there is a crucial difference:
whereas ‘professional’ participants can be punished if they are detected breaking the
trial protocol (by banning them from future enrolment in paid trials), patients coordinat-
ing on PLM could not be deterred so simply: the threat of not being enrolled again might
not seem very intimidating to them, as it will soon become clear.
7 For 26 weeks, full time, between September 2011 and April 2012, the ethnographer
took notes on a daily basis about events and episodes of significance for the ethnography
and also for the kinds of questions he was helping with. He sat in 128 meetings ranging
from Software Development to R&D, Health Data Integrity, and Community team
meetings, as well as project task-force and company-wide meetings. He collaborated
with most of the employees on site, and corroborated the observational and documental
material with focused interviews for a total of 30 hours of recording. Some of this ethno-
graphic research has been published as peer-reviewed articles before, but these works did
not deal with the issues this article is concerned with (Kallinikos & Tempini, 2014;
Tempini, 2015, 2017).
8 Scraping is a technical term for the extraction of data from a raw html source, i.e. the
information that makes up a webpage.
9 In their final report (Wicks et al., 2012), the patient-researchers declared that they
had no financial interest in the outcome.
10 As important as it is to recognize the heartbreaking and dramatic personal stories
behind the events at the heart of this paper, regrettably, we cannot discuss them any
further. The dilemmas of caring for terminally ill patients with experimental treatments
have been extensively analyzed in bioethics. For the latest episode in this debate, see, for
instance Carrieri, Peccatori and Boniolo (2018).
11 In the EU, it is now mandatory to release these data sets. See the European Med-
icines Agency policy on publication of clinical data for medicinal products for human use
(EMA/240810/2013, 2 October 2014).
12 Recall that the patients had registered with PLM and had chosen to share their data
through the site’s questionnaires and communication tools.
13 As we saw, it is not simply the breach of the trial’s blinding: Persevering’s initiative
through PLM disclosed preliminary data about the prospects of NP001 as a treatment.
Trial data could be of potential financial value for investing (or disinvesting) in the drug
developer.
14 In widely publicized appearances before US and UK legislators, Facebook has been
resisting concerns about its accountability over the content that is shared on its network,
by claiming to be a technology company not a media company (hence trying to shift the
legislators’ choice of the framework through which it would be regulated). The endless
controversy caused by Facebook’s standards and choices on content moderation high-
lights the unavoidable clash between the principle of neutrality over users’ use of the
media for communication, and protecting diverse principles of legality and cultural norms.
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15 This vocabulary is inspired by Lanzara’s seminal organization studies paper,
Ephemeral organizations in extreme environments (1983).
16 These new regulatory developments are still controversial and we think there are
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